Northern Syria: Who switched on the light for the shadow game?
What happened yesterday in northern Syria may have been unexpected for many people. But even if those who have been following this closely did not expect to see it unfold like this, it still felt unsettling.
I cannot say what happened surprised me. An outburst of anger was bound to happen somehow. However, it is necessary to understand the process correctly.
Although these events erupted because of the Kayseri incident, this is not the main reason. Although the Syrians are the actors in the showcase, it is someone else who is reaping the harvest.
Are you looking closely?
To use a cliché, “Nothing is as it seems”. The current events are the result of a long story depicting the fragile political and military environment in northern Syria.
Turkey is not the sole and only responsible for this. Turkey is in a position to take steps within the framework of its own program, and in this respect, it is in a position to use its military presence in international political relations. What more could a state want?
The Syrian opposition, on the other hand, is not a monolithic and ideologically unified structure, and many of its components do not know what they would do with the country if Assad said he was quitting tomorrow.
Yes, they are all in favour of the revolution, but no one has a post-revolutionary program. The SNA is in the center of this picture. This is why Syrians insist on maintaining certain practical lines. However, this insistence is not the result of a political vision and determination, but a summary of their experiences.
The SNA is still a militia organization. It is not a regular army. It has no ideological formation like HTS or PKK. This provides a very favorable environment for the infiltration for other actors. We experienced this during the 1 July events.
But it is impossible to say that the SNA is completely innocent. Nevertheless, let us make the following note: The SNA has 90,000 personnel, of which 42,000 are combatants. The number we encountered in the demonstrations is around 3 per thousand. It is also known who belongs to which group. According to SNA sources, work is being carried out on these personnel and some civilians.
By the way, the cause of the incidents is not smuggling or commercial interest. Let’s make this clear in one sentence and move on. Another issue is the claim that the situation in Afrin is related to the Kurdish population there. Most of the people identified in the videos in Afrin are Arabs. They are not Kurds. It is very cheap to attribute the incident to “actually they are PKK provocateurs”.
Now let’s come to the main issue.
Just when Turkey was taking steps on these issues, on the SNA and on strengthening the political structure of northern Syria, the events of the last 10 days opened a window of operation for third parties.
The insistence and opening of the Abu Zendin gate has already renewed some tensions in the past months, which need not be mentioned here. President Erdoğan’s remarks on Assad were added to this. Those who have followed and analyzed the 48 hours in between know that very intense propaganda was made. The Kayseri incident, which erupted with the provocation of racists, provided the material to focus the anger on Turks.
Suddenly and everywhere
Around noon, small groups suddenly appeared at many points and started provocative actions with serious telegram support. Everything was ready. The actions, which normally took place in squares and in front of mosques, directly targeted institutions and military points where Turks were present.
The videos were quickly broadcasted through 7 specific channels. The relations of some of these channels with the SNA are also known. 7 channels quickly broadcast the videos with slogans targeting Turks. They also stated the targets.
Within 1 hour, attacks on Turkish commercial trucks, PTT, and hospitals in at least 9 points, and 105 minutes later, attacks on Turkish flags and bases began. Messages were spread on Telegram that the actions in Northern Syria would be insufficient and that it was necessary to march to Turkish bases in Idlib. The first Turkish flag-burning video was also served from Idlib. People were directed in front of our 5 military points in Idlib.
All this was not just a coincidence. In Afrin, armed and masked people were reported to arrive on motorbikes around the governor’s office in the 19th minute of the demonstrations. Similarly, armed and masked men arrived around the Bab al-Salam border crossing north of Azaz 11 minutes after the demonstrations started. Some of them were SNA members. Some were not.
Everyone knows what happened afterward. But few people know what happened behind the scenes.
Who switches on the light?
Shadow plays require light, and in the north of Syria, there was someone who switched on the light and lengthened and shortened the shadows in the direction they wanted.
I do not hesitate to say it very clearly, that there are two focal points channeling the anger accumulated in the north: The Russians and the PKK.
The Russians and the PKK are following the problems between Turkey and the SMO and the local population very closely. They have studied well how to exploit the difference in angle between Ankara and the opposition. Turkey is in Syria to fight the PKK. And the Syrians want to overthrow the regime, or at least get their rights through 2254. The unregulated gap between these two objectives and the racism factor tolerated in Turkey make the situation open to all kinds of operations.
We have lived through a process co-produced by the PKK’s Arab relations in the SMO region and the Russian propaganda machine.
According to the analyses of the discourse, the telegram channels that provocatively spread the demonstrations were based on “fascist Turks”, “invaders”, “Ottomans” and “Turks must get out of Syria”, targeting some SMO commanders in northern Syria. Several channels broadcasting from Europe and Lebanon took the lead in its dissemination.
The rest was already taken care of by flies in the light. Turkish social media influencers such as Haskoloğlu, who live off interaction, spread the messages unconsciously as intended. Turkish social media was already open to outrage.
At several points, provocateurs were found to be wearing military uniforms to create a mise-en-scene. SNA members who participated in demonstrations and opened fire on Turkish commercial lorries were also identified. Other provocateurs were also identified.
Actors, fools and opportunists
When it became clear from the outset that the events were organized, it seemed that instead of direct intervention, surveillance was chosen to expose the actors, fools and opportunists. This was later confirmed by sources familiar with the matter.
According to the sources, news and video flow, discourse analysis, sharing chains, prominent individuals, SMO members and those pretending to be SMO members were identified. Technical and humint studies were carried out. The fools who were caught in the flood of directed anger were also identified. Some groups and opportunists seeking revenge against Turkey were also identified.
At the end of all these events, everyone from the veteran journalist to the social media phenomenon, from the German-sponsored journalist to the moderate nationalist, from the opposition Assad supporter to those who tweeted for the Ak Parti and talked about everything on TV, were spewing hatred against the SMO and Syrians. The product was as desired. Even the TV channels were presenting the issue as an operation against the normalization of the regime with Turkey. However, this was precisely what the issue was meant to make them think that way.
